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Annex II — Technical and Organisational Measures

Attaches to Modules 2 and 3 of the SCCs (Decision (EU) 2021/914). Describes the measures the data importer implements under Clause 8.6 and Art. 32 GDPR.

Drafting rule for this Annex: claim only what is verifiably true of the deployed stack. An overclaimed security measure in an executed SCC is a contractual breach and a misrepresentation to the supervisory authority. Measures not yet verified against the deployed stack are tracked separately as open items and are deliberately not folded into the body of this Annex: what is written below is what is in place. Controllers may request the current open-item list, the data protection impact assessment, or the incident-response procedure from [email protected].


1. Pseudonymisation and data minimisation

  • Message content is never stored. Only per-message word counts are persisted. This is enforced at ingest, not by later deletion.
  • Every behavioural record keys on a Discord snowflake rather than a name or email. This is pseudonymisation, not anonymisation — the operator treats it as personal data throughout and applies storage limitation accordingly.
  • Only score-relevant metadata is retained. No special-category data is collected or sought; where it arrives incidentally through a self-set profile field or presence, it is subject to the same minimisation, retention and erasure controls.
  • Abuse detection reuses data already held (account age, join burst); it triggers no additional ingestion.

2. Encryption

  • In transit, externally — all client and dashboard traffic is served over TLS; the Discord gateway and REST connections are TLS-terminated by Discord.
  • In transit, internally — the application reaches PostgreSQL over the container network. AGORA_API_POSTGRESQL_SSL_MODE is configurable and the production hardening guard refuses to start the service on disable under an ENV=prod or stage profile.
  • At rest — the production data volume is LUKS2-encrypted (aes-xts-plain64, 512-bit key). Every container volume — the PostgreSQL cluster, the RabbitMQ spool, the Redis dump — lives on it, so all personal data held by the Service is encrypted at rest on disk. The volume is unlocked at boot from a keyfile held on the server's root disk: this protects the data if the volume is decommissioned, snapshotted, detached, or its blocks reused by the provider, and it does not protect against an attacker who already controls the running host. That boundary is stated rather than glossed, because an overclaimed measure in executed Clauses is a contractual breach. Applied 20 August 2026.
  • Backups at rest — dumps are encrypted with age before leaving the host, to a public key whose private half is deliberately not stored on the server, so a compromised production host cannot read its own backup history.

3. Access control

  • Dashboard authentication is Discord OAuth2 only; there is no local password store and therefore no password database to breach.
  • Sessions use a short-lived JWT access token plus a revocable refresh token.
  • Authorisation is guild-scoped: RequireGuildManage gates administrative routes to the guild owner and delegated managers; RequireSelf gates personal-data export and deletion to the data subject themselves, so an administrator has no privilege over another member's raw activity data.
  • Premium-only capabilities are gated server-side, not in the client.
  • Administrative access to production infrastructure is limited to the operator, who is the sole natural person with such access.
  • Multi-factor authentication is enabled on the operator's Zoho account, which holds the privacy@ and support@ mailboxes, with offline recovery codes held separately from the primary device. Org-wide MFA enforcement is not configured: the panel is not exposed on the current plan, and with a single user it would bind nobody the personal setting does not already cover. It is to be enabled if a second user is ever created.
  • Role separation on the mail tenant follows three standing rules, appropriate to a single-operator organisation:
    1. exactly one Super Admin — the operator — and no shared credentials;
    2. shared addresses (dmarc@, and any future billing@ / legal@) exist only as aliases or groups on an existing mailbox, never as user accounts with their own logins;
    3. any third party granted access (e.g. an accountant) receives their own account with a scoped Admin or Member role, never the Super Admin login.

4. Resilience and availability

  • Components run under the samsara supervisor with per-component criticality tiers and restart policies; a failing component is restarted rather than taking down the process.
  • HTTP read, write and idle timeouts are non-zero by default (slowloris protection).
  • Authentication endpoints are rate-limited per source IP.
  • Container healthchecks are defined for the stage and production compose profiles.

5. Restore ability

The database is dumped nightly (pg_dump, custom format) and encrypted client-side with age to a public key whose private half is not held on the production host, so a compromised server can write backups it cannot read; the private key is kept with the break-glass credentials. Encrypted dumps are copied to an offsite provider distinct from the one hosting the server, so the loss of a single account is not the loss of both copies. A documented restore procedure is versioned alongside the scripts and written to be executed by someone other than the operator.

Two properties of this arrangement are load-bearing beyond ordinary availability:

  • Rotation is bounded by the deletion promise. Backups are pruned on a 14-day ceiling, and the prune script refuses to run above it, because the DPA and Privacy Policy tell data subjects their data is deleted within 30 days "allowing for backup rotation" — a statement that holds only while every backup containing the deleted rows expires inside that window. The uninstall purge erases the live data within 15 days of removal, leaving the backups the other 15.
  • Restores do not silently resurrect erased data. A dump predates any erasure honoured after it was taken, so restoring it would reinstate personal data that a data subject asked to have deleted. The erasure evidence log is therefore exported hourly, separately from the full dump, precisely because a restore rolls the in-database copy of that log back too; an offline command replays every erasure recorded after the restored dump's timestamp, and the restore is documented as incomplete until it has run.

Still open: the procedure has not been exercised, since no production environment exists yet. Art. 32(1)(c) requires the ability to restore in a timely manner, which is demonstrated by a tested restore rather than by possessing backup files. A monthly rehearsal into a throwaway database, logged per run, is the evidence this measure will rest on.

6. Configuration integrity — fail-fast production guard

Under an ENV=prod or stage profile the backend refuses to start while any of the following unsafe settings is in effect:

  • wildcard CORS origin on the authenticated API
  • PostgreSQL SSL_MODE=disable
  • a non-empty Swagger file path (which would expose unauthenticated /docs and swagger.json routes)
  • AGORA_API_BILLING_FREEMIUS_ALLOW_INSECURE=true (which would skip payment-webhook signature verification)

A misconfigured production deployment therefore aborts loudly instead of silently running in an insecure state.

7. Logging and traceability

  • Every request is assigned or inherits an X-Request-ID and is logged through a request-scoped logger bound to that ID and, once authenticated, to the user ID, so all lines for one request correlate.
  • Moderation actions are attributable and audited (mod_action).
  • Election audit entries record that a member voted, never their choices; the tally reads database rows only and never Discord reaction state, so ballot secrecy holds by construction.
  • Every erasure run writes an erasure_log evidence row (guild, optional user, scope, source, row counts).

8. Integrity of payment and webhook handling

Inbound payment-provider webhooks are signature-verified before any state change. The verification bypass is a development-only switch that the production hardening guard refuses to start with.

9. Data-subject rights by design

  • privacy.EraseMember and privacy.EraseGuild fan a request across every domain holding personal data. A build-failing coverage test enforces that any new table containing personal data is wired into the orchestrator or explicitly justified as excluded — so erasure coverage cannot silently regress as the schema grows.
  • Self-service export and deletion are exposed to the member directly (/forgetme, gated behind a typed confirmation, and a self-gated HTTP endpoint).
  • Moderation records are anonymised rather than deleted on member erasure — identifying IDs are zeroed to a sentinel and free-text reasons blanked — preserving audit integrity while severing the link to the person. On guild uninstall the audit rationale lapses and the records are fully purged.
  • Members may opt out of collection; opting out erases data already held and suppresses further capture at both ingest and resync.

10. Storage limitation, enforced in code

  • Raw activity events are capped at ≤ 90 days; configuration validation rejects at startup a window of zero, a negative window, or any value above the 90-day policy ceiling. The escape hatch for an unbounded window is a development-only flag which must be false in production.
  • A retention worker prunes raw events; presence event logs are pruned past their watermark.
  • A departed-member TTL worker bounds the long-departed pseudonymous tail.
  • A guild-purge worker erases guilds that remain uninstalled past the grace period.
  • Support and privacy correspondence (the Zoho mailboxes, which are outside the database and therefore outside the workers above) is deleted 12 months after the thread closes. This is a manual quarterly purge, not an automated retention policy: the automated facility is a paid-plan feature the operator does not hold. Each purge is logged with its date and the cut-off applied, since a manual control that leaves no evidence cannot be demonstrated under Art. 5(2). Threads under an active dispute or a pending supervisory authority query are held until it closes, then deleted on the next purge.

11. Human oversight of automated decisions

  • Score thresholds are set by the guild administrator, not by the operator.
  • Consequential outcomes retain human-in-the-loop overrides: an administrator can override automatic role reconciliation and election-candidacy eligibility (Art. 22 mitigation).
  • Abuse flags are strictly advisory and never auto-punish; a human moderator reviews and resolves each.
  • Members can obtain the logic of their own score through an in-product breakdown.

12. Organisational measures

  • A written incident-response procedure exists, available to controllers on request, covering detection, containment, assessment, notification thresholds and record-keeping, and treating a buggy erase, a leaked log, an over-broad query or a lost backup as a personal data breach — not only external attack.
  • A published security contact and vulnerability-reporting route.
  • Subprocessor engagement is governed by Art. 28 contracts; the current list is published and maintained (see Sub-processors and Annex III).
  • Source changes go through CI running build, vet, formatting and the full test suite, including the erasure-coverage test.
  • The production host is configured from version-controlled files rather than by hand: SSH is key-only with no password authentication, inbound traffic is default-deny except the SSH and web ports, failed SSH authentication is rate-limited and banned automatically, operating-system security updates are applied automatically, and system logs are retained locally for 30 days.

13. Measures for transfers to subprocessors

The operator imposes on each subprocessor, by written contract, data-protection obligations no less protective than those in these Clauses, including the security measures in this Annex to the extent relevant to that subprocessor's processing. Where a subprocessor is located outside the EEA, the transfer is covered either by that subprocessor's own SCC-based instrument with the operator as exporter, or by Module 3 of these Clauses. See Annex III.

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